As another disquieting attribute, the following must yet be stated:
In the nineteenth century our cities began more and more to lose the character of cultural sites and to descend to the level of mere human settlements. The small attachment of our present big-city proletariat for the town they live in is the consequence of the fact that it is only the individual's accidental local stopping place, and nothing more. This is partly connected with the frequent change of residence caused by social conditions, which do not give a man time to form a closer bond with the city, and another cause is to be found in the general cultural insignificance and poverty of our present-day cities per se.
At the time of the wars of liberations the German cities were not only small in number, but also modest as to size. The few really big cities were mostly princely residences, and as such nearly always possessed a certain cultural value and for the most part also a certain artistic picture. The few places with more than fifty thousand inhabitants were, compared to present-day cities with the same population, rich in scientific and artistic treasures When Munich numbered sixty thousand souls, it was already on its way to becoming one of the first German art centers; today nearly every factory town has reached this number, if not many times surpassed it, yet some cannot lay claim to the slightest real values. Masses of apartments and tenements, and nothing more How, in view of such emptiness, any special bond could be expected to arise with such a town must remain a mystery. No one will be particularly attached to a city which has nothing more to offer than every other, which lacks every individual note and in which everything has been carefully avoided which might even look like art or anything of the sort.
But, as if this were not enough, even the really big cities grow relatively poorer in real art treasures with the mounting increase in the population. They seem more and more standardized and give entirely the same picture as the poor little factory towns, though in larger dimensions. What recent times have added to the cultural content of our big cities is totally inadequate. All our cities are living on the fame and treasures of the past. For instance, take from present-day Munich everything that was created under Ludwig I,l and you will note with horror how poor the addition of significant artistic creations has been since that time. The same is true of Berlin and most other big cities.
The essential point, however, is the following: our big cities of today possess no monuments dominating the city picture, which might somehow be regarded as the symbols of the whole epoch. This was true in the cities of antiquity, since nearly every one possessed a special monument in which it took pride. The characteristic aspect of the ancient city did not lie in private buildings, but in the community monuments which seemed made, not for the moment, but for eternity, because they were intended to reflect, not the wealth of an individual owner, but the greatness and wealth of the community. Thus arose monuments which were very well suited to unite the individual inhabitant with his city in a way which today sometimes seems almost incomprehensible to us. For what the ancient had before his eyes was less the humble houses of private owners than the magnificent edifices of the whole community. Compared to them the dwelling house really sank to the level of an insignificant object of secondary importance.
Only if we compare the dimensions of the ancient state structures with contemporary dwelling houses can we understand the overpowering sweep and force of this emphasis on the principle of giving first place to public works. The few still towering colossuses which we admire in the ruins and wreckage of the ancient world are not former business palaces, but temples and state structures; in other words, works whose owner was the community. Even in the splendor of late Rome the first place was not taken by the villas and palaces of Individual citizens, but by the temples and baths, the stadiums, circuses, aqueducts, basilicas, etc., of the state, hence of the whole people.
Even the Germanic Middle Ages upheld the same guiding principle, though amid totally different conceptions of art. What in antiquity found its expression in the Acropolis or the Pantheon now cloaked itself in the forms of the Gothic Cathedral. Like giants these monumental structures towered over the swarming frames wooden, and brick buildings of the medieval city, and thus became symbols which even today, with the tenements climbing higher and higher beside them, determine the character and picture of these towns. Cathedrals, town halls, grain markets, and battlements are the visible signs of a Inception which in the last analysis was the same as that of antiquity.
Yet how truly deplorable the relation between state buildings and private buildings has become today! If the fate of Rome should strike Berlin, future generations would some day admire the department stores of a few Jews as the mightiest works of our era and the hotels of a few corporations as the characteristic expression of the culture of our times. Just compare the miserable discrepancy prevailing in a city like even Berlin between the structures of the Reich and those of finance and commerce
Even the sum of money spent on state buildings is usually laughable and inadequate. Works are not built for eternity, but at most for the need of the moment. And in them there is no dominant higher idea. At the time of its construction, the Berlin Schloss was a work of different stature than the new library, for instance, in the setting of the present time. While a single battleship represented a value of approximately sixty millions, hardly half of this sum was approved for the first magnificent building of the Reich, intended to stand for eternity, the Reichstag Building. Indeed, when the question of interior furnishings came up for decision, the exalted house voted against the use of stone and ordered the walls trimmed with plaster; this time, I must admit, the parliamentarians did right for a change: stone walls are no place for plaster heads.
Thus, our cities of the present lack the outstanding symbol of national community which, we must therefore not be surprised to find, sees no symbol of itself in the cities. The inevitable result is a desolation whose practical effect is the total indifference of the big-city dweller to the destiny of his city.
This, too, is a sign of our declining culture and our general collapse. The epoch is stifling in the pettiest utilitarianism or better expressed in the service of money. And we have no call for surprise if under such a deity little sense of heroism remains. The present time is only harvesting what the immediate past has sown.
All these symptoms of decay are in the last analysis only the consequences of the absence of a definite, uniformly acknowledged philosophy and she resultant general uncertainty in the judgment and attitude toward the various great problems of the time. That is why, beginning in education, everyone is half-hearted and vacillating, shunning responsibility and thus ending in cowardly tolerance of even recognized abuses. Humanitarian bilge becomes stylish and, by weakly yielding to cankers and sparing individuals, the future of millions is sacrificed.
How widespread the general disunity was growing is shown by an examination of religious conditions before the War. Here, too, a unified and effective philosophical conviction had long since been lost in large sections of the nation. In this the members officially breaking away from the churches play a less important role than those who are completely indifferent. While both denominations maintain missions in Asia and Africa in order to win new followers for their doctrine-an activity which can boast but very modest success compared to the advance of the Mohammedan faith in particular right here in Europe they lose millions and millions of inward adherents who either are alien to all religious life or simply go their own ways. The consequences, particularly from the moral point of view, are not favorable.
Also noteworthy is the increasingly violent struggle against the dogmatic foundations of the various churches without which in this human world the practical existence of a religious faith is not conceivable. The great masses of people do not consist of philosophers; precisely for the masses, faith is often the sole foundation of a moral attitude. The various substitutes have not proved so successful from the standpoint of results that they could be regarded as a useful replacement for previous religious creeds. But if religious doctrine and faith are really to embrace the broad masses, the unconditional authority of the content of this faith is the foundation of all efficacy. What the current mores, without which assuredly hundreds of thousands of well-bred people would live sensibly and reasonably but millions of others would not, are for general living, state principles are for the state, and dogmas for the current religion. Only through them is the wavering and infinitely interpretable, purely intellectual idea delimited and brought into a form without which it could never become faith. Otherwise the idea would never pass beyond a metaphysical conception; in short, a philosophical opinion. The attack against dogmas as such, therefore, strongly resembles the struggle against the general legal foundations of a state, and, as the latter would end in a total anarchy of the state, the former would end in a worthless religious nihilism.
For the political man, the value of a religion must be estimated less by its deficiencies than by the virtue of a visibly better substitute. As long as this appears to be lacking, what is present can be demolished only by fools or criminals.
Not the smallest blame for the none too delectable religious conditions must be borne by those who encumber the religious idea with too many things of a purely earthly nature and thus often bring it into a totally unnecessary conflict with so-called exact science. In this victory will almost always fall to the latter, though perhaps after a hard struggle, and religion will suffer serious damage in the eyes of all those who are unable to raise themselves above a purely superficial knowledge.
Worst of all, however, is the devastation wrought by the misuse of religious conviction for political ends. In truth, we cannot sharply enough attack those wretched crooks who would like to make religion an implement to perform political or rather business services for them. These insolent liars, it is true, proclaim their creed in a stentorian voice to the whole world for other sinners to hear; but their intention is not, if necessary, to die for it, but to live better. For a single-political swindle, provided it brings in enough, they are willing to sell the heart of a whole religion; for ten parliamentary mandates they would ally themselves with the Marxistic mortal enemies of all religions-and for a minister's chair they would even enter into marriage with the devil, unless the devil were deterred by a remnant of decency.
If in Germany before the War religious life for many had an unpleasant aftertaste, this could be attributed to the abuse of Christianity on the-part of a so-called ' Christian ' party and the shameless way in which they attempted to identify the Catholic faith with a political party.
This false association was a calamity which may have brought parliamentary mandates to a number of good-for-nothings but injury to the Church.
The consequence, however, had to be borne by the whole nation, since the outcome of the resultant slackening of religious life occurred at a time when everyone was beginning to waver and vacillate anyway, and the traditional foundations of ethics and morality were threatening to collapse.
This, too, created cracks and rifts in our nation which might present no danger as long as no special strain-arose, but which inevitably became catastrophic when by the force of great events the question of the inner solidity of the nation achieved decisive importance.
Likewise in the field of politics the observant eye could discern evils which, if not remedied or altered within a reasonable time, could be and had to be regarded as signs of the Reich's coming decay. The aimlessness of German domestic and foreign policy was apparent to everyone who was not purposely blind. The regime of compromise seemed to be most in keeping with Bismarck's conception that 'politics is an art of the possible.' But between Bismarck and the later German chancellors there was a slight difference which made it permissible for the former to let fall such an utterance on the nature of politics while the same view from the mouths of his successors could not but take on an entirely different meaning. For Bismarck with this phrase only wanted to say that for the achievement of a definite political goal all possibilities should be utilized, or, in other words, that all possibilities should be taken into account; in the view of his successors, however, this utterance solemnly released them from the necessity of having any political ideas or goals whatever. And the leadership of the Reich at this time really had no more political goals; for the necessary foundation of a definite philosophy was lacking, as well as the necessary clarity on the inner laws governing the development of all political life.
There were not a few who saw things blackly in this respect and flayed the planlessness and heedlessness of the Reich's policies, and well recognized their inner weakness and hollowness but these were only outsiders in political life; the official government authorities passed by the observations of a Houston Stewart Chamberlain with the same indifference as still occurs today. These people are too stupid to think any-thing for themselves and too conceited to learn what is necessary from others-an age-old truth which caused Oxenstierna to cry out: 'The world is governed by a mere fraction of wisdom';l and indeed nearly every ministerial secretary embodies only an atom of this fraction. Only since Germany has become a republic, this no longer applies. That is why it has been forbidden by the Law for the Defense of the Republic 2 to believe, let alone discuss, any such thought. Oxenstierna was lucky to live when he did, and not in this wise republic of ours.
Even in the pre-War period that institution which was supposed to embody the strength of the Reich was recognized by many as its greatest weakness: the parliament or Reichstag. Cowardice and irresponsibility were here completely wedded.
One of the foolish remarks which today we not infrequently hear is that parliamentarism in Germany has 'gone wrong since the revolution.' This too easily gives the impression that it was different before the revolution. In reality the effect of this institution can be nothing else than devastating-and this was true even in those days when most people wore blinders and saw nothing and wanted to see nothing. For if Germany was crushed, it was owing not least to this institution; no thanks are owing to the Reichstag that the catastrophe did not occur earlier; this must be attributed to the resistance to the activity of this gravedigger of the German nation and the German Reich, which persisted in the years of peace.
Out of the vast number of devastating evils for which this institution was directly or indirectly responsible, I shall pick only a single one which is most in keeping with the inner essence of this most irresponsible institution of all times: the terrible halfheartedness and weakness of the political leaders of the Reich both at home and abroad, which, primarily attributable to the activities of the Reichstag, developed into one of the chief reasons for the political collapse.
Half-hearted was everything that was subject in any way to the influence of this parliament, regardless which way you look.
Half-hearted and weak was the alliance policy of the Reich in its foreign relations. By trying to preserve peace it steered inevitably toward war.
Half-hearted was the Polish policy. It consisted in irritating without ever seriously going through with anything. The result was neither a victory for the Germans nor conciliation of the Poles, but hostility with Russia instead.
Half-hearted was the solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question. Instead of crushing the head of the French hydra once and for all with a brutal fist, and then granting the Alsatian equal rights, neither of the two was done. Nor could it be, for in the ranks of the biggest parties sat the biggest traitors-in the Center, for example, Herr Wetterle.
All this, however, would have been bearable if the general halfheartedness had not taken possession of that power on whose existence the survival of the Reich ultimately depended: the army.
The sins of the so-called 'German Reichstag' would alone suffice to cover it for all times with the curse of the German nation. For the most miserable reasons, these parliamentary rabble stole and struck from the hand of the nation its weapon of self-preservation, the only defense of our people's freedom and independence. If today the graves of Flanders field were to open, from them would arise the bloody accusers, hundreds of thousands of the best young Germans who, due to the unscrupulousness of these parliamentarian criminals, were driven, poorly trained and half-trained, into the arms of death; the fatherland lost them and millions of crippled and dead, solely and alone so that a few hundred misleaders of the people could perpetrate their political swindles and blackmail, or merely rattle off their doctrinaire theories.
While the Jews in their Marxist and democratic press proclaimed to the whole world the lie about 'German militarism' and sought to incriminate Germany by all means, the Marxist and democratic parties were obstructing any comprehensive training of the German national man-power. The enormous crime that was thus committed could not help but be clear to everyone who just considered that, in case of a coming war, the entire nation would have to take up arms, and that, therefore, through the rascality of these savory representatives of their own so-called 'popular representation,' millions of Germans were driven to face the enemy half-trained and badly trained. But even if the consequences resulting from the brutal and savage unscrupulousness of these parliamentary pimps were left entirely out of consideration: this lack of trained soldiers at the beginning of the War could easily lead to its loss, and this was most terribly confirmed in the great World War.
The loss of the fight for the freedom and independence of the German nation is the result of the half-heartedness and weakness manifested even in peacetime as regards drafting the entire national man-power for the defense of the fatherland.
If too few recruits were trained on the land, the same halfheartedness was at work on the sea, making the weapon of national self-preservation more or less worthless. Unfortunately the navy leadership was itself infected with the spirit of halfheartedness. The tendency to build all ships a little smaller than the English ships which were being launched at the same time was hardly farsighted, much less brilliant. Especially a fleet which from the beginning can in point of pure numbers not be brought to the same level as its presumable adversary must seek to compensate for the lack of numbers by the superior fighting power of its individual ships. It is the superior fighting power which matters and not any legendary superiority in 'quality.' Actually modern technology is so far advanced and has achieved so much uniformity in the various civilized countries that it must be held impossible to give the ships of one power an appreciably larger combat value than the ships of like tonnage of another state. And it is even less conceivable to achieve a superiority with smaller deplacement as compared to larger.
In actual fact, the smaller tonnage of the German ships was possible only at the cost of speed and armament. The phrase with which people attempted to justify this fact showed a very serious lack of logic in the department responsible for this in peacetime. They declared, for instance, that the material of the German guns was so obviously superior to the British that the German 28-centimeter gun was not behind the British 30.5centimeter gun in performance!!
But for this very reason it would have been our duty to change over to the 30.5-centimeter gun, for the goal should have been the achievement, not of equal but of superior fighting power. Otherwise it would have been superfluous for the army to order the 42-centimeter mortar, since the German 21-centimeter mortar was in itself superior to any then existing high trajectory French cannon, and the fortresses would have likewise fallen to the 30.5-centimeter mortar. The leadership of the land army, however, thought soundly, while that of the navy unfortunately did not.
The neglect of superior artillery power and superior speed lay entirely in. the absolutely erroneous so-called 'idea of risk.' The navy leadership by the very form in which it expanded the fleet renounced attack and thus from the outset inevitably assumed the defensive. But in this they also renounced the ultimate success which is and can only be forever in attack.
A ship of smaller speed and weaker armament will as a rule be sent to the bottom by a speedier and more heavily armed enemy at the firing distance favorable for the latter. A number of our cruisers were to find this out to their bitter grief. The utter mistakenness of the peacetime opinion of the navy staff was shown by the War, which forced the introduction, whenever possible, of modified armament in old ships and better armament in newer ones. If in the battle of Skagerrak the German ships had had the tonnage, the armament, the same speed as the English ships, the British navy would have found a watery grave beneath the hurricane of the more accurate and more effective German 38-centimeter shells.
Japan carried on a different naval policy in those days. There, on principle, the entire emphasis was laid on giving every single new ship superior fighting power over the presumable adversary. The result was a greater possibility of offensive utilization of the navy.
While the staff of the land army still kept free of such basically false trains of thought, the navy, which unfortunately had better 'parliamentary' representation, succumbed to the spirit of parliament. It was organized on the basis of half-baked ideas and was later used in a similar way. What immortal fame the navy nevertheless achieved could only be set to the account of the skill of the German armaments worker and the ability and incomparable heroism of the individual officers and crews. If the previous naval high command had shown corresponding intelligence, these sacrifices would not have been in vain.
Thus perhaps it was precisely the superior parliamentary dexterity of the navy's peacetime head that resulted in its misfortune, since, even in its building, parliamentary instead of purely military criteria unfortunately began to play the decisive role. The half-heartedness and weakness as well as the meager logic in thinking, characteristic of the parliamentary institution, began to color the leadership of the navy.
The land army, as already emphasized, still refrained from such basically false trains of thought. Particularly the colonel in the great General Staff of that time, Ludendorff, carried on a desperate struggle against the criminal half-heartedness and weakness with which the Reichstag approached the vital problems of the nation, and for the most part negated them. If the struggle which this officer then carried on was nevertheless in vain, the blame was borne half by parliament and half by the attitude and weakness even more miserable, if possible- of Reich Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Yet today this does not in the least prevent those who were responsible for the German collapse from putting the blame precisely on him who alone combated this neglect of national interests-one swindle more or less is nothing to these born crooks.
Anyone who contemplates all the sacrifices which were heaped on the nation by the criminal frivolity of these most irresponsible among irresponsibles, who passes in review all the uselessly sacrificed dead and maimed, as well as the boundless shame and disgrace, the immeasurable misery which has now struck us, and knows that all this happened only to clear the path to ministers' chairs for a gang of unscrupulous climbers and job-hunters-anyone who contemplates all this will understand that these creatures can, believe me, be described only by words such as ' scoundrel, ' ' villain, ' ' scum, ' and ' criminal, ' otherwise the meaning and purpose of having these expressions in our linguistic usage would be incomprehensible. For compared to these traitors to the nation, every pimp is a man of honor.
Strangely enough, all the really seamy sides of old Germany attracted attention only when the inner solidarity of the nation would inevitably suffer thereby. Yes, indeed, in such cases the unpleasant truths were positively bellowed to the broad masses, while otherwise the same people preferred modestly to conceal many things and in part simply to deny them. This was the case when the open discussion of a question might have led to an improvement. At the same time, the government offices in charge knew next to nothing of the value and nature of propaganda. The fact that by clever and persevering use of propaganda even heaven can be represented as hell to the people, and conversely the most wretched life as paradise, was known only to the Jew, who acted accordingly; the German, or rather his government, hadn't the faintest idea of this.
During the War we were to suffer most gravely for all this.
Along with all the evils of German life before the War here indicated, and many more, there were also many advantages. In a fair examination, we must even recognize that most of our weaknesses were largely shared by other countries and peoples, and in some, indeed, we were put completely in the shade, while they did not possess many of our own actual advantages.
At the head of these advantages we can, among other things, set the fact that, of nearly all European peoples, the German people still made the greatest attempt to preserve the national character of its economy and despite certain evil omens was least subject to international financial control. A dangerous advantage, to be sure, which later became the greatest instigator of the World War. But aside from this and many other things, we must, from the vast number of healthy sources of national strength, pick three institutions which in their kind were exemplary and in part unequaled.
First, the state form as such and the special stamp which it had received in modern Germany.
Here we may really disregard the individual monarchs who as men are subject to all the weaknesses which are customarily visited upon this earth and its children; if we were not lenient in this, we would have to despair of the present altogether, for are not the representatives of the present regime, considered as personalities, intellectually and morally of the most modest proportions that we can conceive of even racking our brains for a long time? Anyone who measures the 'value' of the German revolution by the value and stature of the personalities which it has given the German people since November, 1919, will have to hide his head for shame before the judgment of future generations, whose tongue it will no longer be possible to stop by protective laws, etc., and which therefore will say what today all of us know to be true, to wit, that brains and virtue in our modern German leaders are inversely proportionate to their vices and the size of their mouths.
To be sure, the monarchy had grown alien to many, to the broad masses above all. This was the consequence of the fact that the monarchs were not always surrounded by the brightest -to put it mildly-and above all not by the sincerest minds. Unfortunately, a number of them liked fiatterers better than straightforward natures, and consequently it was the fiatterers who 'instructed' them. A very grave evil at a time when many of the world's old opinions had undergone a great change, spreading naturally to the estimation in which many old-established traditions of the courts were held.
Thus, at the turn of the century the common man in the street could no longer find any special admiration for the princess who rode along the front in uniform. Apparently those in authority were incapable of correctly judging the effect of such a parade in the eyes of the people, for if they had, such unfortunate performances would doubtless not have occurred. Moreover, the humanitarian bilge-not always entirely sincere-that these circles went in for repelled more than it attracted. If, for example, Princess X condescended to taste a sample of food in a people's kitchen, in former days it might have looked well, but now the result was the opposite. We may be justified in assuming that Her Highness really had no idea that the food on the day she sampled it was a little different from what it usually was; but it was quite enough that the people knew it.
Thus, what may possibly have been the best intention became ridiculous, if not actually irritating.
Stories about the monarch's proverbial frugality, his much too early rising and his slaving away until late into the night, amid the permanent peril of threatening undernourishment, aroused very dubious comments. People did not ask to know what food and how much of it the monarch deigned to consume; they did not begrudge him a 'square' meal; nor were they out to deprive him of the sleep he needed; they were satisfied if in other things, as a man and character, he was an honor to the name of his house and to the nation, and if he fulfilled his duties as a ruler. Telling fairy tales helped little, but did all the more harm.
This and many similar things were mere trifles, however. What had a worse effect on sections of the nation, that were unfortunately very large, was the mounting conviction that people were ruled from the top no matter what happened, and that, therefore, the individual had no need to bother about anything. As long as the government was really good, or at least had the best intentions, this was bearable. But woe betide if the old government whose intentions were after all good were replaced by a new one which was not so decent; then spineless compliance and childlike faith were the gravest calamity that could be conceived of.
But along with these and many other weaknesses, there were unquestionable assets.
For one thing, the stability of the entire state leadership, brought about by the monarchic form of state and the removal of the highest state posts from the welter of speculation by ambitious politicians. Furthermore, the dignity of the institution as such and the authority which this alone created: likewise the raising of the civil service and particularly the army above the level of party obligations. One more advantage was the personal embodiment of the state's summit in the monarch as a person, and the example of responsibility which is bound to be stronger in a monarch than in the accidental rabble of a parliamentary majority-the proverbial incorruptibility of the German administration could primarily be attributed to this. Finally, the cultural value of the monarchy for the German people was high and could very well compensate for other drawbacks. The German court cities were still the refuge of an artistic state of mind, which is increasingly threatening to die out in our materialistic times. What the German princes did for art and science, particularly in the nineteenth century, was exemplary. The present period in any case cannot be compared with it.
As the greatest credit factor, however, in this period of incipient and slowly spreading decomposition of our nation, we must note the army. It was the mightiest school of the German nation, and not for nothing was the hatred of all our enemies directed against this buttress of national freedom and independence. No more glorious monument can be dedicated to this unique institution than a statement of the truth that it was slandered, hated, combated, and also feared by all inferior peoples. The fact that the rage of the international exploiters of our people in Versailles was directed primarily against the old German army permits us to recognize it as the bastion of our national freedom against the power of the stock exchange. Without this warning power, the intentions of Versailles would long since have been carried out against our people. What the German people owes to the army can be briefly summed up in a single word, to wit: everything.
The army trained men for unconditional responsibility at a time when this quality had grown rare and evasion of it was becoming more and more the order of the day, starting with the model prototype of all irresponsibility, the parliament; it trained men in personal courage in an age when cowardice threatened to become a raging disease and the spirit of sacrifice, the willingness to give oneself for the general welfare, was looked on almost as stupidity, and the only man regarded as intelligent was the one who best knew how to indulge and advance his own ego. it was the school that still taught the individual German not to seek the salvation of the nation in lying phrases about an international brotherhood between Negroes, Germans, Chinese, French, etc., but in the force and solidarity of our own nation.
The army trained men in resolution while elsewhere in life indecision and doubt were beginning to determine the actions of men. In an age when everywhere the know-it-alls were setting the tone, it meant something to uphold the principle that some command is always better than none. In this sole principle there was still an unspoiled robust health which would long since have disappeared from the rest of our life if the army and its training had not provided a continuous renewal of this primal force. We need only see the terrible indecision of the Reich's present leaders, who can summon up the energy for no action unless it is the forced signing of a new decree for plundering the people; in this case, to be sure, they reject all responsibility and with the agility of a court stenographer sign everything that anyone may see fit to put before them. In this case the decision is easy to take; for it is dictated.
The army trained men in idealism and devotion to the fatherland and its greatness while everywhere else greed and materialism had spread abroad. It educated a single people in contrast to the division into classes and in this perhaps its sole mistake was the institution of voluntary one-year enlistment. A mistake, because through it the principle of unconditional equality was broken, and-the man with higher education was removed from the setting of his general environment, while precisely the exact opposite would have been advantageous. In view of the great unworldliness of our upper classes and their constantly mounting estrangement from their own people, the army could have exerted a particularly beneficial effect if in its own ranks, at least, it had avoided any segregation of the so-called intelligentsia. That this was not done was a mistake; but what institution in this world makes no mistakes? In this one, at any rate, the good was so predominant that the few weaknesses lay far beneath the average degree of human imperfection.
It must be attributed to the army of the old Reich as its highest merit that at a time when heads were generally counted by majorities, it placed heads above the majority. Confronted with -the Jewish-democratic idea of a blind-worship of numbers, the army sustained belief in personality. And thus it trained what the new epoch most urgently needed: men. In the morass of a universally spreading softening and effeminization, each year three hundred and fifty thousand vigorous young men sprang from the ranks of the army, men who in their two years' training had lost the softness of youth and achieved bodies hard as steel. The young man who practiced obedience during this time could-then learn to command. By his very step you could recognize the soldier who had done his service.
This was--the highest school of the German nation, and it was not for nothing that the bitterest hatred of those who from envy and-greed needed and desired the impotence of the Reich and the defenselessness of its citizens was concentrated on it What many Germans in their blindness or ill will did not want to see was recognized-by the foreign world: the German army was the mightiest weapon serving the freedom of the German nation and the sustenance of its children.
The third in the league, along with the state form and the army, was the incomparable civil service of the old Reich.
Germany was the best organized and best administered country in the world. The German government official might well be accused of bureaucratic red tape, but in the other countries things were no better in this respect; they were worse. But what the other countries did not possess was the wonderful solidity of this apparatus and the incorruptible honesty of its members. It was better to be a little old-fashioned, but honest and loyal, than enlightened and modern, but of inferior character and, as is often seen today, ignorant and incompetent. For if today people like to pretend that the German administration of the pre-War period, though bureaucratically sound, was bad from a business point of view, only the following answer can be given: what country in the world had an institution better directed and better organized in a business sense than Germany's state railways? It was reserved to the revolution to go on wrecking this exemplary apparatus until at last it seemed ripe for being taken out of the hands of the nation and socialized according to the lights of this Republic's founders; in other words, made to serve international stock exchange capital, the power behind the German revolution.
What especially distinguished the German civil service and administrative apparatus was their independence from the individual governments whose passing political views could have no effect on the job of German civil servant. Since the revolution, it must be admitted, this has completely changed. Ability and competence were replaced by party ties and a self-reliant, independent character became more of a hindrance than a help.
The state form, the army. and the civil service formed the basis for the old Reich's wonderful power and strength. These first and foremost were the reasons for a quality which is totally lacking in the present-day state: state's authority! For this is not based on bull-sessions in parliaments or provincial diets, or on laws for its protection, or court sentences to frighten those who insolently deny it, etc., but on the general confidence which may and can be placed in the leadership and administration of a commonwealth. This confidence, in turn, results only from an unshakable inner faith in the selflessness and honesty of the government and administration of a country and from an agreement between the spirit of the laws and the general ethical view. For in the long run government systems are not maintained by the pressure of violence, but by faith in their soundness and in the. truthfulness with which they represent and advance the interests of a people.
Gravely as certain evils of the pre-War period corroded and threatened to undermine the inner strength of the nation, it must not be forgotten that other states suffered even more than Germany from most of these ailments and yet in the critical hour of danger did not nag and perish. But if we consider that the German weaknesses before the War were balanced by equally great strengths, the ultimate cause of the collapse can and must lie in a different field; and this is actually the case.
The deepest and ultimate reason for the decline of the old Reich lay in its failure to recognize the racial problem and its importance for the historical development of peoples. For events in the lives of peoples are not expressions of chance, but processes related to the self-preservation and propagation of the species and the race and subject to the laws of Nature, even if people are not conscious of the inner reason for their actions.
